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When expert operators interact with a new device, they inevitably reuse former interaction 
modes and actions. This phenomenon is due to the human cognition seeking resources 
savings. Schemas support this strategy and are implemented in such a way that perfection is 
disregarded at the profit of an intuitive trade-off between performance and cognitive 
resources savings. As a consequence, humans have a strong inclination to fit well-known 
solution procedures into new problems. For this reason, changes in work environments can 
cause accidents when they allow operators to interact with a new device if the latter is 
erroneously perceived as familiar. This research issue originates from an industrial 
background. The suspected cause of a fatal error performed by an operator in a steelworks 
factory is replicated in an experiment. The results support the hypothesis according to 
which errors (and possible subsequent accidents) due to changes in the interface are more 
likely when the latter does not inhibit former modes of interaction. This main result is 
discussed under the angle of cognitive ergonomics and used as a basis to provide design 
guidelines. 
 
Keywords: Negative transfer; Accident; Interface changes; Human-machine interaction; 
Human error. 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The study of field situations from the standpoint of cognitive ergonomics aims at 
understanding cognitive acts within the context in which they happen. Humans, their tools, 
their reasoning processes and actions inside the environment are classical features of this kind 
of approach. The latter can be deliberately quantitative when research aims at isolating a 
particular parameter, e.g. the cause of an error. In this case, experimentation can be used to 
assess the effect of one or several factors on a given aspect of behaviour. This is the direction 
taken in this paper. A field study was conducted in a steelworks company where an accident 
occurred, which led to the death of an operator. This study was initiated in order to trace back 
the psychological causes of this accident. The latter will be treated as an error in the human-
machine interaction. 
 
We identify two wide classes of exception in human-machine interaction: a) exceptions that 
occur after deployment for which designers have not conceived any procedure due to the 
unlikelihood of these events and b) situations that are unexpectedly similar to others for which 
well-defined procedures and skills exist. Our paper deals with the second case and will try to 
highlight the risks associated with certain types of similarities at the interface level. The 
adopted angle sets the focus on the mental processes involved in interface changes. It follows 
that this paper is quite remote from raw performance metrics applied to interfaces (e.g. 
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Rauterberg, 1992). Instead, an account of the mental processes involved in control tasks (as in 
Woods et al., 1987) and an analysis of the errors performed when interacting with changing 
interfaces will be presented. 
1.1 Description of the accident 
The following event occurred during a night shift in March 1990 at ASCOMETAL, a French 
steelworks factory employing some 500 people. An experienced operator was working on a 
thread drawing machine, a device that reduces the diameter of a metal thread by a series of 
tractions (see Figure 1). Typically, the output thread is coiled onto a drum and kept in place 
by pressing wheels. Opening and closing the wheels is done by rotating a two-positions 
button. Because of the high tension of the thread, there are times in the process where opening 
the pressing wheels is extremely hazardous.  
The operator used to work with eleven thread drawing machines. On the machine involved in 
the accident, the open and closed positions of the pressing wheels button were swapped as 
compared to the ten other machines. This swap was well-known but was not flagged or 
equipped with any kind of protection. Because of the swapped commands, the operator 
unintentionally opened the pressing wheels at a step of the process where this action is 
forbidden. The operator was violently hit by the thread uncoiling from the drum. This resulted 
in the death of the operator. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Legends 
1- Input thread 
2- Diameter reduction tool 
3- Coiling drum 
4- Pressing wheel 
5- Output thread coiling in the pit 
6- Safety barrier 
7- Coiling drum control pedals 
8- Pressing wheels control buttons 
9- Operator’s platform 
10- Main control panel 
11- Ground level 
 
Figure 1: Schematic view of the cable drawing machine 
 
From a psychological point of view, the tools’ characteristics were discrepant with respect to 
the routine control mode. Therefore, the skills implemented by the operator did not match the 
specific constraints imposed by this tool. In other words, the accident did not occur because 
the operator simply made an error (see Doireau, Wioland & Amalberti, 1995) but rather 
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because the conditions in which this error occurred were unusual. When a tool changes, e.g. 
as the result of an upgrade, skills must adapt accordingly in order to reflect the changes and 
maintain the accuracy of the interaction. But updating skills requires repetitive feedback from 
the system in a wide variety of cases so that operators can progressively reduce the 
discrepancies between the system's expected behaviour and the system's actual behaviour. 
During this sensitive period, errors on critical functions of a hazardous tool can be fatal. 
1.2 Objective and outline of the paper 
Our objective is now to investigate, under laboratory settings, some of the factors that led to 
the accident. As Green and Hoc (1991) and Hoc (1993) suggest, this is a classic approach in 
cognitive ergonomics. Although it could be objected that lab experiments are far too reductive 
as compared to the complexity of natural environments (as noted by Perruchet, 1997), it 
nonetheless originates from a field situation, giving some credit to our approach (Sperandio, 
1995). Also, laboratory experiments allow one to isolate a specific factor and to study it 
without unwanted contextual side-effects (work colleagues’ conversation, unavailability of 
operators as experimental participants, managers supervising the operator during the 
experiment, etc.). Lastly, we believe even small-scale experiments are worth attempting. 
Since psychological data usually rely on a well-documented theoretical background, they still 
permit, however microscopic they are, to increase the predictive power of psychology. This 
approach is one where the human cognitive system is considered as a deterministic machine 
but whose complexity is still beyond our current predictive capacities. 
 
The paper will mainly rely on a psychological theoretical framework in order to document the 
suspected core factors involved in the accident. We will test these factors in an experiment 
where we will assess the role of the mental processes involved. For scope matters, we will 
clearly disregard organisational factors, although we acknowledge they always play a 
significant role in accidents (see Bieder, 2000; Reason, 1990; 1995; 1997; 2000). In doing so, 
we will miss the richness of a multi-layered analysis. On the other hand, it will allow us to 
allocate more effort in an in-depth study of individual factors. 
The outline of the paper is as follows. We will first present the cognitive concepts that framed 
the research (section 2). We will then describe the method of the experiment (section 3) 
designed to test the suspected causes of the accident. The results (section 4) will lead to a 
discussion on the theoretical and practical outcomes of our research (section 5). 
2 SCHEMA-DRIVEN COGNITION 
2.1 Overview of the concept 
Schemas appear in a wide class of studies whose topics include medical diagnosis (Lesgold et 
al., 1988), car driving (Van Elslande, 1992), problem solving by analogy (Catrambone & 
Holyoak, 1989; Novick & Holyoak, 1991), aircraft piloting (Amalberti, 1992) and computer 
program understanding (Detienne, 1996). Schemas are high-level knowledge structures that 
support any aspect of knowledge and human skills (Reason, 1990). They support the fast 
processing of routine situations for which one acts virtually automatically from their 
identification. The concept of schema is close to Rasmussen’s (1986) rule-based level of 
control and this parallel has already been established (Bollon & Channouf, 1993) 1 . 
Historically, the concept of schema originates from Bartlett (1932) but some psychological 
                                                 
1
 Although schemas could be matched with the skill-based level of Rasmussen’s (1986) model, we object that 
the latter is more about a sensorimotor level of control. We prefer the analogy to the rule-based level of control, 
following Salminen and Tallberg (1996). 
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processes similar to schemas have been described, among others, by such terms as 
experiential knowledge (Fink & Lusth, 1987), scripts (Boshuizen et al., 1991; Custers et al., 
1996; Shank & Abelson, 1977) and frames (Minsky, 1986). For the time being, let us just 
assert that a schema-based action is conditioned by the identification of a set of activators in a 
situation (e.g. the statement of a problem or the symptoms of an illness). These activators then 
trigger the schema which, in turn, controls the actions performed. The process is roughly 
similar to an [IF…THEN] statement where some conditions have to be detected for the schema 
to trigger (Govindaraj & Su, 1988).  
A schema is a piece of knowledge meant to solve problems for which skills have already been 
built. But since all problems are not familiar in the first place, we first need to have a look at a 
potential explanation for schema building. This will feed our description of the nature and 
role of schemas. When a problem is unknown2, one tries to solve it by trial and error, or 
formally speaking, by hypothesis testing (Byrne, 1989; Liu, 1991). Once a solution has been 
found, it usually can be stored in memory and thus becomes repeatable. With time, the 
repetitive exposure to the same category of problems leads to the building and recall of a 
generic solution. Also, trigger rules are progressively built, that bind together a) the solution 
and b) the category of problems it solves. On the basis of experience, this set of rules is 
progressively refined and tuned (Rauterberg, 1995) until it triggers the schema only for the 
relevant cases. However, because humans found their interaction with the world on memory 
of past experiences (Randel & Pugh, 1996; Roediger, 1980), it happens that for most new 
problems, there is a solution to another problem that can be adapted for reuse. As we will see 
in the next section, this is a known feature of human cognition that can induce flaws in 
human-machine interaction. 
2.2 Schemas and negative transfer 
So far, schemas have been presented as a form of knowledge that supports human reasoning. 
As this research is interested in the cognitive features involved in the occurrence of an 
accident, the fallible aspect of human reasoning has to be addressed. We will thus revisit 
schemas under a very common angle in cognitive ergonomics: error. However, we have to 
emphasize that human errors are not always mere cognitive dysfunctions. Often, and it is the 
case in our study, errors are marginal events caused by the same mechanisms that generate 
correct acts most of the time (Johnson et al., 1992). As a consequence, errors are not by-
products of cognition. They are the side-effects of a risk induced by a heuristic reasoning 
strategy, the latter being aimed, time after time, at trading off an optimal performance against 
the lowest mental cost (Amalberti, 1996). 
Since Simon (1957) and his concept of bounded rationality, it is accepted that humans’ 
actions do not reach perfection. In this conception, humans’ actions rather seek optimality 
with respect to their goals and what the cognitive resources allow. The fact that the cognitive 
system is not aimed at handling all the data available in the environment is a central aspect of 
the cognitive resources saving strategy. For instance, a general practitioner selects the 
symptoms that, by experience, have been discovered to be required for the diagnosis of given 
illness. Furthermore, these selected data do not all have the same status. The ones that support 
a core function of a task (or are typical of suspected illness) are often those which must be 
detected in priority. They happen to be stored in memory with functional alterations in order 
to increase their saliency in the environment and reflect their specific role (Endsley & Smith, 
1996; Ochanine, 1978; Moray, 1987). This view is part of a modern operational formalisation 
of reasoning activities where cognitive resources support the heuristic execution of a task 
rather than the exhaustiveness of a pure logical analysis. 
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 e.g. the Hanoi tower, assuming one has never solved anything similar before. 
© 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. 5 
In line with the resources saving strategy, a schema provides a ready-made solution procedure 
in response to a situation identified as a pattern of data rather than as a series of hierarchical 
goals (see Boreham, Foster & Mawer, 1992). However, one of the drawbacks of schemas (see 
Reason, 1987a for an overview) is that they can be activated as soon as their trigger 
conditions reach an appropriate level (Norman, 1983), even if these conditions are not optimal. 
Thus schemas can lead to errors when a known pattern of data is detected in an unknown 
problem. The latter can then be recognised as familiar, processed like a routine one with a 
high probability of errors. This explains why general practitioners sometimes have difficulties 
in identifying exceptional diseases and confuse their symptoms with more benign cases. 
Moreover, since expert operators usually allocate few resources for controlling the execution 
of a schema-driven action, they have difficulties in detecting exceptions. This phenomenon 
(experimentally studied by Bastien-Toniazzo, 1999 and Besnard, 2000) is a potential 
explanation for errors committed by expert operators. 
 
The heuristic cognitive acts allowed by schemas aim at saving the resources allocated to the 
execution of a given task. One of the weaknesses of this saving strategy lies in the potentially 
flawed management of changing situations, which is the scope of this paper. For instance, 
when people lack knowledge on one aspect of a machine, they attempt to learn by analogy. 
This derivation may lead to errors if the mapping between one domain and the other is not 
consistent (Norman, 1983). Thus, when operators have developed skills on a given tool, 
changes in the interface may lead one to activate former control actions that have now 
become irrelevant. A negative transfer can then occur that impairs the performance on the 
task. As stated by Bösser (1983, p. 117), “…remindings often lead to ineffective and incorrect 
use of commands because analogies are based on irrelevant aspects of similarity of previous 
tasks”. Bösser referred to studies performed in the domain of text editing when upgrading 
from a typewriter to a text-editor. In a similar domain, Walker and Olson (1988) demonstrated 
that keybindings that are built in a consistent manner (e.g. all deletions commands begin with 
the Alt key) limit interference effects when subsequent keybindings have to be learned. 
These authors define two directions of negative transfer: prospective and retrospective. Our 
study is interested in the former, where initial skills impair performance after a change. 
Readers can refer to Postman (1971) for a review of the various methods and experimental 
approaches to transfer. 
 
Negative transfer can be a potential cause of accidents when this phenomenon happens in an 
environment where safety is a critical dimension. Johnson (1989) suggests that one needs to 
know a) what knowledge is likely to be transferred, b) what knowledge is appropriate or 
inappropriate to be transferred and c) what facilitates such a transfer. Our study will tackle 
these issues by investigating candidate conditions to negative transfer effects: 
• Experience. The operator must be experienced since this transfer relies on a domain-
specific (Schanteau, 1992) schema or rule-based level of control. 
• Surface similarity. The previous interface must share specific features with the new 
interface for the latter to be identified as belonging to the area of expertise of the 
operator. These features are the ones the initial schema built itself upon and now needs 
to trigger. 
• Structure discrepancy. The underlying structure of the task must have become 
discrepant to the surface features of the new interface. 
 
In line with the accident described in section 1.1 and the theoretical background exposed in 
section 2, we expect errors to occur as a function of the similarity of mappings across 
interfaces. We know from the literature that if a schema can detect some activators belonging 
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to a former interface, it is then likely that this schema will trigger and control the interaction 
with the new interface. Now, if discrepancies exist between the behaviour of the new interface 
and what the schema prescribes as correct actions, then errors have to be expected. This 
generic hypothesis will be tested on a simple simulated control task. 
3 METHOD 
3.1 Description of the task 
We designed a simple computer-based control task (see screenshot in Figure 2). Participants 
have to fill up 4 classes of containers (upper left corner) with four classes of items (middle 
boxes).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Screenshot of the interface of the control task 
 
We chose to use fruits (bananas, pears, cherries and strawberries) for their ease of 
identification and intuitive meaning. The central area of the screenshot displays the four areas 
where the four classes of items are represented. The bottom count bar displays the number of 
items left to be processed. 
 
The task can be described as picking up fruits and then putting them in a container when 
hands are full. It is cyclic and is composed of three stages. 
• Step 1, Pointing. Participants ask the system to randomly point to a class of items. A 
black bar is then displayed on the top of the class box which the system points to. 
• Step 2, Selecting. Participants have to respond by selecting the same class of items as 
the one pointed by the system. The class selected by participants is highlighted in the 
bottom count bar. 
• Step 3, Filling or Emptying. Participants ask for one item of the selected class to be 
sent in the corresponding box. At this point, the cycle goes back to stage 1. When a 
box contains 3 items, participants must ask for it be emptied and a container appears 
on the screen. The cycle then goes back to step 1 (see Figure 3 below). 
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Figure 3: Description of a cycle 
3.2 Participants 
Twenty students, unselected for age and sex, from various departments of the University of 
Provence (France) took part in the experiment and were. Each group of 10 subjects was 
composed of 8 female and 2 male participants. Although differences in gender were balanced 
across groups, participants were left unscreened for age and background. Instead, we strictly 
controlled the level of performance of the participants in a training task (see section 3.3) 
before they were allocated to one or the other experimental condition (see section 3.4). The 
training task guaranteed that all participants had reached a performance baseline before they 
performed the experimental task. Despite the difference in the experimental and drawing 
machine tasks, if negative transfer can be observed among subjects that only have a few hours 
of practice, it may reveal the strength of the phenomenon among operators that have 
thousands of hours of experience in a highly specialised task.  
3.3 Training task 
The participants had to execute 108 cycles in 3 trials3 without error, which set an even level of 
performance across the sample of participants. The task was restarted if an error occurred, 
until 108 error-free cycles were completed. The controls were keyboard-based according to 
Table 1 (upper section). The keys had colour stickers on so that participants could easily 
locate them on the keyboard. One participant did not reach the performance criterion and was 
not included in the rest of the study.  
3.4 Experimental conditions 
After the training session, the participants were assigned to one of the two following 
experimental conditions where they had another 108 cycles (still in 3 trials) to perform: 
• Swapped commands. The controls were keyboard-based according to Table 1 (middle 
section); 
• On-screen commands. The controls were icons displayed on the screen (see Figure 4 
for a screenshot) and mapped to control functions as shown in Table 1 (lower section). 
 
                                                 
3
 The decomposition is as follows: 9 items per class x 4 classes x 3 trials. 
Pointing 
Emptying 
If items = 3 
Filling 
If items < 3 
Selecting 
Step 1 
Step 3 
Step 2 
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Table 1: Key-function mappings for the training phase, the swapped condition and the on-
screen condition 
 
Key 
 
 
 
 
Function Pointing Selecting Filling Emptying 
Key-function mapping for the training phase 
Key  
 
 
 
Function Pointing Selecting Filling Emptying 
Key-function mapping for the swapped condition 
Icon 
  
 
 
Function Pointing Selecting Filling Emptying 
Key-function mapping for the on-screen condition 
 
In each condition, an on-screen message was displayed when a participant made an error. This 
had no consequence over the performing of the task. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Screenshot of the interface for the on-screen condition 
 
Needless to say, the splitting of experimental conditions into two discrete categories does not 
reflect the spectrum of similarity that exists in real work conditions. Namely, interfaces can be 
more or less similar to one another, as opposed to merely similar or different. The idea of a 
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break point in the abovementioned spectrum might account better for the distribution of 
performance levels. However, this angle requires an experiment of a wider scale than the one 
reported here since a large number of conditions have to be tested. For the sake of clarity, we 
therefore opted for a simple experimental plan which we believe is adapted to the simple 
question we ask in this research. 
3.5 Variables 
The participants performed 3 trials from which the means of the following dependent 
variables were formed4: 
• Time. This is the number of seconds needed by the participants to complete the task. 
• Total. This is the mean of all the other variables below. Because it is a mean, its value 
is lower than that of some of the variables. 
• Omission errors. They are one or several steps that are skipped in a cycle.  
• Commission errors. They are actions that are not relevant to the current system’s state. 
It is the case of a participant who would empty a class box before it is full (i.e. it 
contains less than 3 items). 
• Previous interface. These errors would have been correct actions under the training 
interface. This is an essential variable for our analysis of the negative transfer. 
• Other errors. These are erroneous actions such as mistyping or any other action that 
cannot be interpreted as belonging to the above variables. 
3.6 Predictions 
We assume that errors will originate from the failure to inhibit key-function mappings built 
during the training phase. When the interface changes, we expect interferences to occur due to 
the persistence of these previous mappings. As our aim is to experimentally investigate 
negative transfer rather than decomposing it into its sub-components, we do not make 
predictions for each variable. We will only expect the following: 
• In the swapped condition, we globally expect a large number of errors since the same 
keyboard keys are now dedicated to different functions. The similarity with the key-
function mapping of the training phase should leave enough room for the former 
schema to partly override the learning of the new interface. This may cause major 
disruptions in participants’ performance and it is the condition where errors due to the 
previous interface (the training one) are expected to be highest. 
• In the on-screen condition, the very nature of the interface will have changes. The 
participants will control the system via a mouse by clicking on icons displayed on the 
screen (see screenshot in Figure 4). Because of the difference with the training 
interface, we predict that this experimental condition restricts the possibilities of 
transferring the previous key-function mapping. As a consequence, we expect less 
disruptions in this condition. Additionally, we expect the errors due to the previous 
interface to be lowest in this condition. 
4 RESULTS 
The significant results are summarised in Table 2 and in Figure 5. Comments will appear in 
the next section. 
 
 
                                                 
4
 The variables labelled omission errors and commission errors are derived from Gobet & Simon (1996) and 
Hollnagel (1993). 
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Table 2: Summary of the significant means. Minimum and maximum scores appear as raw, 
individual data. These scores in the total column are not the sum of the scores on the other 
variables. 
 
 total omission commission prev. interface other 
On-screen 0.3 0.03 0.23 0.19 0.09 
min. score 0 0 0 0 0 
max. score 3 1 1 2 2 
SD 0.33 0.10 0.22 0.23 0.22 
Swapped 1.8 1.2 0.57 0.89 0.89 
min. score 2 0 0 0 1 
max. score 15 13 4 6 9 
SD 1.29 1.98 0.47 0.63 0.89 
      
F value 12.54 9.40 4.05 10.87 7.6 
df 18 18 18 18 18 
p 0.002 0.006 0.059 0.004 0.013 
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Figure 5: Graphical representation of the significant means 
 
An analysis of variance at a significance threshold of .05 revealed the following results. The 
effect of interface on time did not reach significance (on screen=220.26; swapped=216.66; 
F(1;18)=0.02; p=.885). The effect of interface on the mean total number of errors did reach 
significance: In the on-screen condition, participants performed a mean of 0.3 errors vs. 1.8 in 
the swapped condition (F(1;18)=12.54; p=.002). Three out of five of the error measures 
(omission, commission & previous interface, respectively) reached significance. The details 
of these three results now follow. 
Firstly, the number of omission errors differed significantly across groups. In the on-screen 
condition, participants performed 0.03 errors vs. 1.2 in the swapped condition (F(1;18)=9.40; 
p=.006). Secondly, the effect of interface on commission errors produced marginally 
significant differences. The on-screen participants performed 0.23 error vs. 0.57 for the 
swapped participants (F(1;18)=4.05; p=.059). Thirdly, as predicted, there were fewer errors 
© 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. 11 
due to the previous interface in the on-screen condition (m=0.19) than in the swapped 
condition (m=0.89) (F(1;18)=10.87; p=.004). 
Similarly to the above, the effects of the interface change on the other errors were lower in the 
on-screen condition (m=0.09) than in the swapped condition (m=0.89; F(1;18)=7.60; p=.013). 
 
As stated in section 3, participants all had to perform 3 trials during both the training and the 
experimental task. While the data for the training phase were not available, we nonetheless 
carried out a simple descriptive analysis of the decay of the number of errors over trials in the 
experimental conditions (on-screen vs. swapped). Table 3 and Figure 6 provide a summary of 
the data. 
 
Table 3: Mean number of errors over trials 
 
 trial 1 trial 2 trial 3 
On-screen 0.7 0 0.2 
Swapped 2.3 1.8 1.3 
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Figure 6: Graphical representation of the mean number of errors over trials 
 
Although no statistical analysis of the local effects of each trial has been carried out, the data 
seem to suggest that a) the mean total number of errors was globally decreasing over trials in 
all conditions and b) this decrease started from a much lower error score in the on-screen 
condition. This might explain why the total number of errors in this latter condition is 
significantly lower than in the swapped condition (see Table 2). 
5 DISCUSSION 
As we have seen in the previous section, all significant error measures show higher values in 
the swapped condition. This is the interface where the negative transfer effect is strongest and 
causes major disruptions in performance. Considering this in more detail, the results show 
that omission errors are more contrasted across the two conditions than commission errors, 
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the latter reaching a poor level of statistical significance (p=.059). The errors due to the 
previous interface show a significant difference between the two conditions. Again, the 
swapped condition shows the highest number of errors. The other errors also show a higher 
rate in the swapped condition, conforming to the trend of results. In a future work, it would be 
worth splitting this variable and investigating it more deeply as it may reveal some nuances 
that our generic, high-level variables have probably masked. In our interpretation, the 
swapped interface causing more errors than the screen interface is due to the activation of a 
former schema. Thus, as a preliminary conclusion, it seems highly plausible that a negative 
transfer occurs when two interfaces or problems share surface features but have different 
structures (Blessing & Ross, 1996; Novick, 1988). 
In hindsight, the changes we have implemented in our experiment can be seen as dramatic 
ones. From a human-machine interaction point of view, the swapped condition has a 
massively disruptive impact on the interaction. It allocates previous commands to new 
functions and, as demonstrated by the experiment, this is the worst change one could ever 
think of. However, these changes are not that radical from a design point of view. The 
commands and the functions in the swapped condition are still the same as in the training 
phase, as opposed to the on-screen condition. So one issue here is that the effect of changes 
on performance cannot be directly derived from the amount of graphical amendments to the 
interface. Instead, a dimension of importance is the extent to which the changes performed 
still allow the operator to erroneously activate pre-existing skills, given that some transfer will 
inevitably occur. 
5.1 A heuristics-based interpretation 
Reason (1990) and Decortis (1993) suggest that the human reasoning globally obeys two 
heuristics: frequency gambling and similarity matching. Our research is clearly concerned 
with these concepts. We suspect that when a novel interface shares features with a previous 
one, action patterns that relied on these features in the past tend to be imported and potentially 
abusively reused. This cognitive resource-saving strategy is heuristic since it tolerates 
imperfection. We are of the opinion that this constitutes the cognitive cause of negative 
transfer. Figure 7 provides a graphical description of this mechanism.  
The building of negative transfer across the computer interfaces is described in the left-hand 
side of the figure whereas the right-hand side is about the drawing machine interfaces. These 
two devices seem to each provide an instance of the abovementioned similarity matching and 
frequency gambling heuristics, respectively. From this standpoint, the similarity between the 
training interface and the swapped interface caused an expert mapping to persist across 
conditions. In the case of the drawing machine interface, we are of the opinion that the 
steelworks operator rather relied on a frequency gambling, due to the particular accidental 
machine’s interface standing alone in a group of eight other uniform machines. Possible 
contributing factors to negative transfer might be workload, fatigue, lack of vigilance and 
other performance shaping factors (as described in Miller & Swain, 1987). These external 
constraints, combined with the cognitive resources saving strategy that underlies the 
interaction economy, can cause changes to be overlooked thereby letting the most frequent 
routine take over the choice of actions. 
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Figure 7: Descriptive model of the negative transfer mechanism 
 
It now has to be said that the heuristic interaction mode that humans adopt in their daily 
activities usually provides a high level of performance. Human cognition is indeed extremely 
good at modelling the regularities of the past, storing and reusing them as a basis for some 
automatic control of actions (Reason, 1987b). This strategy only fails under exceptional 
circumstances. Therefore, we must make clear that a heuristic is not an error generator per se. 
5.2 Rigidity of expert knowledge 
Expert operators can cross the boundaries of their expertise without awareness. In the accident 
described in section 1.1, the operator had overlooked an exception at his workplace and 
implemented routine actions under misdetected non-standard settings. It is already known that 
the more expert operators are, the more rigid (i.e. less adaptable) their knowledge tends to be 
(Gaba, 1991; Hollnagel, 1987; Moray, 1987; Rasmussen & Jensen, 1974). Also, as Reason 
(1987a) puts it, schema-based reasoning is rigid and rule-bound. Solutions to previous 
problems can thus be applied with little attention paid to changes. Rigidity is a drawback 
especially in new situations. It may lead to poor adaptability because of the schema-driven (or 
rule-based) interaction mode being highly prevalent upon any other. It can be noted from 
Figure 6 that the differences in the strength of negative transfer (as described by the 
differences in the mean number of errors over trials) seem to be due to the absolute value 
from which participants start to adjust to the new interface. In this respect, the effects of 
negative transfer could be caused by the difficulty of unlearning previous knowledge and 
inhibiting previous automatisms. This may explain why participants who have to learn a new, 
different key-function mapping (the on-screen condition) show a better performance level. In 
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this respect, the data gathered about the accident and the results obtained in the experiment 
are pieces of evidence of the potential fallibility of cognitive resource-saving strategies across 
changing environments. 
5.3 Methodological considerations 
We demonstrated that some components of expertise can be transferred across interfaces out 
of any control from the operator. It can nonetheless be objected that our experiment compares 
participants and tools that differ very much from the original industrial situation (see Karnas 
& Van De Leemput, 1990). At first sight, this seems undeniable but it does not mean that 
there is nothing to be learned. The objective of our study was to isolate what we believe is a 
task-independent error mechanism and quantify its effects on a control task. We hope we have 
demonstrated that the hypothesized causes of the negative transfer in the experiment could 
shed some light on the causes of the accident with the thread drawing machine. In our opinion, 
the accident and the experiment shared features that allowed us to test the hypothesis of 
negative transfer as a cause of error in the cognitive processing of changing interfaces. As 
summarised by Figure 7, errors in different work settings can be accounted for by similar 
mechanisms. But this may be how far we can stretch the comparison between our experiment 
and the accident. The testing of another hypothesis (e.g. fatigue, light conditions, etc.) would 
most likely require a totally different experiment. 
The complexity of natural work places cannot be cheaply replicated by computer simulations. 
However, a single variable of this complexity (e.g. a suspected error mechanism) can be 
isolated and brought into the laboratory. For such a study, all that is needed is an experimental 
environment that allows one to manipulate the relevant variables (as suggested by Diaper, 
1989). Surface similarities between the natural task and the simulated one are therefore not 
mandatory. As always, the drawback in such an approach is the loss of the interaction 
between the variable under study and the environment of the natural task. This is nothing but 
a dilemma since the taking into account of the whole complexity of natural environments does 
not allow any clear understanding of isolated variables. 
5.4 Recommendations 
We must not assume that humans, especially operators in hazardous processes, always have 
an opportunity for learning. They sometimes die from their errors. Therefore, some 
psychology-centred guidelines may be needed by designers who have to deal with changes in 
evolving interfaces. Hopefully, some of the inherent fallibility of the human cognitive 
processes can be cheaply handled within the design process instead of being dealt with 
retrospectively, at the cost of safety. 
 
The accidental situation we have analysed in this research was similar enough from routine 
ones for it to trigger a skill-based pattern of action (see Rasmussen, 1986). From an 
interdisciplinary point of view, it seems to the authors that whatever could help in gaining 
some soundness in design principles is worth spending some effort. From the parallels we 
drew between our industrial case and the experiment, we will now introduce some simple 
recommendations to interface designers in charge of systems ranging from industrial 
machines’ interfaces to computer-based control tasks’ interfaces. These recommendations 
assume that a) a high performance level on the part of operators and b) the resulting reliability 
of the interaction, require the mental processes involved in human-machine interaction to be 
taken into account when designing work stations (Woods et al., 1987). 
 
• Warnings are not enough. When a change has to be accommodated for by the 
operators of critical tools, warnings are only a starting point. In the end, they help very 
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little since declarative knowledge (e.g. “I have been told that this tool is different than 
the others”) is not strongly correlated to the level of performance (Schraagen & 
Schaafstal, 1996). For instance, the participants of our experiment were told that a 
change had occurred between the training condition and the experimental condition. 
However, the results show clearly that it was not enough for their performance to 
reach the same level as with the previous interface. 
• Don’t change the interface. Heuristics can cause accidents when they drive the 
interaction on interfaces that have changed since it can make these changes easy to 
overlook. This is a serious issue in critical environments. So we suggest that where the 
rules underlying the interaction are kept unchanged (e.g. during an upgrade), the 
command-function mappings should be kept unchanged. Namely in the case of a 
changed interface, new critical functions should not be triggered by pre-existing 
commands. Equally, pre-existing critical functions should not be given new 
commands. However, it has to be acknowledged that systems evolve and function 
mappings cannot always be kept unchanged. Designers should then consider the next 
recommendation. 
• Too much is better than too little. Under the conditions that we have studied, mapping 
changes in an interface can impact on the interaction more than a totally different 
design option. The difficulty of unlearning previous knowledge suggests that 
whenever an interface change is performed and there is a change in the command-
function mapping, the new interface should share as few features as possible with the 
former interface. 
• Keep things consistent. As stated many years ago by Maas (1983), consistency in 
interfaces is one of the keys to system’s transparency. Operators show highest levels 
of performance when the same commands are linked to the same functions. From this 
perspective, it seems obvious that the interface discrepancy of the accidental machine 
with respect to the eight others was a strong contributing factor to the death of the 
operator. When consistency cannot be achieved (e.g. for cost reasons), designers 
should consider the next recommendation. 
• Implement enabling actions. Operators may disregard such things as warning notices 
and signals because of factors like stress or lack of vigilance. Therefore, as a 
complement, a safety device (see Etherton, 1987, for a review) can be required from 
operators before they can use a given function. In the industrial case depicted in 
section 1.1, this device could take the form of an enabling action such as the removal 
of a safety cap fitted to the pressing wheels button before using the machine. The idea 
here is to insert a break point in a routine plan and therefore force the 
acknowledgement of the exceptional nature of the device settings. It also temporarily 
introduces a higher level of cognitive control, thereby easing the rejection of planned 
actions assessed as irrelevant. 
6 LIMITS 
There is a number of related issues that have not been addressed in this paper. One is the 
mode confusion angle (Crow et al., 2000; Leveson et al., 1997) that describes how correct 
actions in particular settings happen to be incorrect in others. We did not mention either such 
factors as decay of vigilance (the accident occurred during a night shift) or slips which are 
known to contribute significantly to occupational accidents. Last but not least, some 
management considerations that have not been included here could help in understanding the 
mechanism that led to neglect interface issues in such a hazardous environment as steelworks. 
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7 CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we attempted to understand and assess in an experiment, the psychological 
causes of an accident that occurred in a steelworks factory, causing the death of an operator. 
Among other factors that we briefly list in section 6, this fatality was caused by changes at the 
workplace not being taken into account by the operator during routine actions. In our opinion, 
a negative transfer caused these familiar operations to trigger within work settings where they 
no longer were relevant. The results of the experiment supported this hypothesis. Changes in 
the interface of a simulated control task generated a negative transfer, causing errors due to 
well-known actions being called under new settings. From the accident data, the results of the 
experiments and the theoretical background, we concluded that human cognition fallibility 
accounts for some of the errors performed during changes in work settings. However, this 
does not mean that this state of facts has to be passively accepted. Instead, we formulate 
simple yet design-centred comments considering human cognition with regards to hazardous 
systems design. Lastly, following Hollnagel (1993), we think the systematic study of 
erroneous actions has the potential to provide a better knowledge of human failure modes and 
to influence the design of more reliable systems. This paper represents our contribution to this 
research avenue. 
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